In the last ten years the space issue, i.e. the study of the role played by space in economic phenomena, has attracted a lot of interest from many economic fields. The combination of increasing returns, market imperfections, and trade costs creates new forces that, together with factor endowments, determine the distribution of economic activities. Despite their theoretical relevance, there is still little evidence, especially at large scale level, on the effective contribution of this externalities to agents' location decisions. The aim of this work is to estimate a model of economic geography, using a space-time panel data on Italian provinces, in order to both test the empirical relevance of this theory, and try to give a measure of the geographic extent of spatial externalities. Particular attention has been devoted to address rigorously those endogeneity issues that naturally arises when dealing with both simultaneity and spatial data. Our results are consistent with the hypothesis that product-market linkages, coming from increasing returns and trade costs, actually influence the geographic concentration of economic activities and that their spread over space is, contrary to previous findings, not negligible.
Introduction
Economic activities are certainly not equally distributed in space. Moreover, a closer look to the shape of their distribution reveals such strong regularities, like the rank-size rule or the gravity law for example, that becomes natural to think about it as a system endowed with a valuable economic structure. 1 However, despite some interesting early contributions made by Hirschman, Perroux or Myrdal, this issue remained unaddressed by mainstream economic theory for a long while. As argued by , this is probably because economists lacked a model embracing both increasing returns and imperfect competition in a general equilibrium setting. Indeed, as shown by Fujita and Thisse [2001] in a very general setting, the price-taking hypothesis is incompatible with the existence of a non-autarchic competitive equilibrium in space.
The relatively recent new economic geography literature (NEG) has finally provided a collection of general equilibrium models explicitly dealing with space, and capable to account for many salient features of the economic landscape.
2 Agents choose their location on the basis of market-price incentives. Then, the combination of increasing returns at firm level with market power (usually in the form of monopolistic competition) and transportation costs, give rise to an endogenous agglomeration, provided that centripetal forces are sufficiently strong. This process is best analyzed is terms of spatial pecuniary externalities. When some workers\firms choose to migrate\delocate, they are likely to affect prices prevailing in both the labor and product market in the two locations of origin and destination. Thus, the location choice of some agents has an impact trough prices (so the pecuniary nature) on other agents creating an externality. Moreover, as Fujita and Thisse [2001] observed, such pecuniary externalities are especially relevant in the context of imperfectly competitive markets because prices do not reflect the social values of individual decisions. At this point increasing returns operates: if they are sufficiently strong to overcome competition for markets and factors, agents will find it convenient to agglomerate.
As himself pointed out, there is a strong connection between the NEG and some older fields in economics. To a large extent, what have been actually done is in fact rediscovering concepts and ideas that did not receive much attention by mainstream economic theory because of their lack of a rigorous formal counterpart. 3 Within this group of overlooked contributions, and of particular interest for the present work, is the literature on market potential begun by Harris (1954) . This literature argued that firms' desirability for a location as a production site depends on its access to markets, and that the quality of this access may be described by an index of market potential which is a weighted sum of the purchasing power of all other locations, with weights depending inversely on distance. Although this approach has proved to be empirically quite powerful in analyzing the location of industry, it totally lacked any microeconomic foundation. At that time there were in fact no rigorous explanations of why a correlation between market access and firms' location should exists. However, Krugman [1992] , Fujita and Krugman [1995] , and Fujita, Krugman and Venables [1999] shows that market potential functions can be obtained from formal spatial generalequilibrium models, thus providing the theoretical background for the use of such approach to study the distribution pattern of economic activities.
The main objective of this work is to estimate a market potential function, coming from a formal model, using data for Italian provinces. The particular model used is a multi-location extension of Helpman [1998] , the latter being a variant of the well-known Krugman [1991] and Krugman [1992] core-periphery models. From an empirical point of view, Helpman [1998] is in fact preferable to Krugman's models because of the less extreme nature of its equilibria. 4 This will in turn allow us to:
1. Obtain estimates of structural parameters to infer about the consistency of Helpman's model with reality.
2. Evaluate our theory-based market potential function in the light of the empirical literature on market potential, in order to investigate the specific contribution of the model in understanding firms' location.
3. Give an idea of the extent of spatial externalities by measuring how far in space a shock in one location affect the others.
There is a growing empirical literature on the location of economic activities, especially at low-scale geographical level. There are, however, differ-ent line of research, each relying on a different agglomeration mechanism. 5 First, agents may be drawn to regions with pleasant weather or other exogenous amenities.
6 Roback [1982] , Beeson and Eberts [1989] , and Gyourko and Tracy [1991] estimate the economic value of such amenities. Second, human capital accumulation by one individual may raise the productivity of her neighbors, making agglomerated regions attractive places to work. 7 Rauch [1993] , Glaeser and Mare [1994] , and Peri [1998] find that wages are higher in cities with higher average education levels. Finally, technological spillovers may also contribute to geographic concentration. 8 A key feature of the NEG approach we are using here is the stress on increasing returns and markets interaction, as opposed to factor endowments (exogenous amenities), and technological externalities (human capital and technological spillovers). Combes and Lafourcade [2001] , and Head and Mayer [2001] , belong to this category.
However, the closest reference with the present analysis is certainly that of Hanson [1998] , to which we will extensively refer throughout the rest of the paper. Hanson [1998 ] uses the same model to estimate a market potential function for US counties. Anyway, we will present evidence that the procedure he used suffers of a serious bias problem, coming from both endogeneity and spatial unit choice. We will consequently suggest an alternative estimation methodology, more rooted in the tradition of Spatial Econometrics and Panel Data Analysis, that address both issues and that can be used for estimation of a quite general class of structural spatial equilibrium models.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical reference model: Helpman [1998] . Section 3 is devoted to give some insights on model interpretation, and to link it closely to the market access tradition. Section 4 deals with data issues, while in Section 5 we discuss econometric concerns. Detailed estimation results are presented in section 6. Finally, in section 7 we draw our conclusions and suggest directions for further research.
The Model
Imagine an economy consisting of Φ locations, two sectors (the manufacturing sector M and the housing sector H), and one production factor (labor). The M-sector produces a continuum of varieties of a horizontally differentiated product under increasing returns to scale, using labor as the only input. Each variety of this differentiated good can be traded among locations incurring in iceberg-type transportation costs. 9 Referring to two generic locations as i and k (i, k = 1, 2, ..., Φ), we thus have that for each unit of good shipped from i to k, just a fraction v i,k = f (d i,k ) of it, where d i,k is distance between the two locations and f () is a decreasing function. This means that, indicating with p m,i the mill price of a variety produced in location i, the corresponding delivered price for the consumer living in k would be p m,i /v i,k . Firms receive mill prices while consumers pay delivered. If nothing else is explicitly mentioned, p m,i is meant to be the mill price. The H-sector provides instead a homogeneous good, housing, that cannot be traded and whose amount in each location (H i ) is supposed to be exogenously fixed. Its price P H,i can therefore differ from one place to another and is determined by the equilibrium between local supply and demand.
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Labor is supposed to be freely mobile, and its (exogenous) total amount in the economy is equal to L. The equilibrium spatial distribution of our workers-consumers is thus determined by both wages (w i ), and prices prevailing in each location. We will denote L i , with
L i = L, as labor in location i, and λ i = L i /L as the corresponding share of total workers. Preferences and technology do not directly depend upon the location where consumption and production take place, but only indirectly through prices. Therefore it is notationally convenient to describe them, as well as firms' behavior, without explicitly referring to any particular location. 9 The term transportation costs does not simply refers to shipment costs but in general to all costs and impediments of doing business in different markets, like information costs, language differences, etc. 10 The major difference between Helpman [1998] and Krugman's standard specification lies precisely in the nature of good H. In Krugman [1991] , and Krugman [1992] this good is supposed to be produced by means of a sector-specific factor, land, under constant returns and perfect competition. Moreover, good H can be traded without incurring in any cost. These assumptions, together with a full-utilization condition for land in any location, ensure the uniqueness of its price, P H,i = P H , that can therefore be set to one for normalization and used as numeraire. Later on, we will see how these two different assumptions about H will influence agglomeration incentives.
Preferences are identical across all workers. As usual in NEG models, they are described by the standard Cobb-Douglas utility function with CES type sub-utility for the differentiated product, i.e.:
where C M stands for an index of the consumption of the M-sector varieties, while C H is housing consumption. We assume that the modern sector provides a continuum of varieties of (endogenous) size N, the consumption index C M is thus given by 11 :
where c m (j) represents the consumption of variety j ∈ [0, N]. Hence, each consumer has a love for variety and the parameter σ ≡ 1/(1 − ρ), varying from 1 to ∞, represents the (constant) elasticity of substitution between any two varieties. The bigger is σ the more varieties are substitutes: when σ is close to 1 the desire to spread consumption over all varieties increases. If Y denotes the consumer income, then the demand function for a variety j coming from utility maximization is:
where p m (j) is here the consumer-price (or delivered price) of our generic variety and P M is the price-index of the differentiated product given by:
11 In the original Helpman [1998] formulation, as well as in Krugman [1991] and Krugman [1992] , N is not a mass but instead the finite number of varieties provided by the market. However, as pointed out by Fujita and Thisse [2001] , this approach is conceptually misleading for the monopolistic competition framework. In fact, in order to be consistent with the requirement that firms are negligible with respect to the market, we should consider a continuum of them. If we do not and use instead an integer number of firms, strategic interactions actually dominates (d'Aspremont, Dos Santos Ferreira and Gerard-Varet [1996] ). However, the way N is actually treated by Helpman, is such that final results are virtually unchanged. Nevertheless, we prefer to use here the continuum formulation.
Technology is the same across locations. Each variant of the differentiated product needs labor to be produced. The relation between the amount of labor used (l(j)) and the quantity of variant j produced (c(j)) is given by:
where f and β are, respectively, the fixed and the marginal labor requirements. The presence of the fixed cost f clearly imply increasing returns. Without loss of generality we choose the unit for labor such that β = 1. Since preferences exhibits a symmetric love for diversity and since there are increasing returns to scale but no scope economies, each variety is produced by a single firm. Moreover, as soon as each firm is supposed to be small relative to the market, firms eventually producing more than 1 (up to a set of zero measure) variety would act as if they were actually different. 12 In turn, this implies an identity between the mass of firms and the mass of varieties with the output of each firm equating the demand for the corresponding variety, the latter coming from consumers spread all over the Φ locations.
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Firms know consumers' demand and choose prices in order to maximize their profits given by:
where w is wage paid by our generic firm and q(j) is its output. However, when they look at demand structure, i.e. equation (3) , it is likely that they consider Y and P M as given. Since each of them has a negligible influence on the market, it may accurately neglect the impact of a price change over both consumers' income and the price index. Consequently, (3) implies that each firm faces an isoelastic downward sloping demand with elasticity given by our parameter σ. Solving first order conditions yields the common equilibrium relation between the optimal price, elasticity of demand, and marginal cost:
12 In our framework the introduction of a new variety cause consumers to split their income on a larger number of goods. If perceived by firms producing more than one variety, this cannibalization effect would require price strategies different from those used by single-good plants. However, the hypothesis of a continuum of varieties makes the above effect negligible from firms point of view. 13 Actually, consumers' expenditure for variety j, and not the quantity demanded, equals the corresponding firm sells. The presence of iceberg transportation costs creates in fact a discrepancy between what is shipped by firms and what consumers receive.
Under free entry, profits are zero. This implies, together with equation (7), that the equilibrium output is a constant given by:
Note that this relation is true wherever our firm is located. As a result, in equilibrium a firm's labor requirement is also unrelated to firms' distribution:
so that the total mass of firms in the manufacturing sector (N) is constant and equal to L/σf . Equation (8) has also another important drawback. Taking the ratio between marginal (mgc) and average cost (avc) and using (8) we get:
Thus, the parameter σ is (in equilibrium) also an (inverse) measure of increasing returns to scale as it reflects the gap between marginal and average costs.
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Firms and consumers have an address in space and must choose a location. We can now summarize the long-run spatial equilibrium of our economy by means of five equations introducing space indexes on preferences and technology. The first equilibrium requirement comes from utility maximization. Our Cobb-Douglas utility function is in fact such that the (optimal) share of expenditure on each product is constant and equal to the corresponding exponent. If E H,i denotes consumers' expenditure on houses in location i, Y i the corresponding income, and C H,i total housing consumption in that region, then ∀i = 1, 2, ..., Φ we have:
where the second equality comes from the equilibrium between local supply and demand of houses (C H,i = H i ).
Since there is free entry and exit and, therefore, zero profit in equilibrium the value of the manufacturing production in each region equals factor earnings (w i λ i L). If we now suppose that each individual owns an equal share of the total housing stock, then income in location i is given by 15 :
Moreover, for a spatial distribution of workers to be an equilibrium, there should be no incentive to move. As they are perfectly mobile, this implies an equalization of real wages in the long run 16 :
Finally, as shown rigorously in Fujita and Thisse [2001] , the last two equilibrium relations are: (14) and
15 From equation (11) total housing expenditure in our Φ locations is given by
. Combining these two relations we finally get equation (12) . It is important to point out that the hypothesis of an equal sharing of the housing stock is not crucial to our analysis. Using alternative assumptions, like that of immobile or even absentee landlords, Helpman [1998] finds no qualitative changes in model behavior. More importantly (12) will not be used to obtain the reduced form equation we will actually estimate. 16 The short-run characterization of the model does not include equation (13) . The dynamics is in fact supposed be driven by real wages differences, with workers moving towards those locations offering them higher real earnings. If in the long-run equilibrium all locations have some manufacturing then (13) will be obviously satisfied. However, contrary to Krugman [1991] , it is really unlikely that (13) does not hold because it would require the price of houses in the abandoned locations to be zero. This is one of the reasons that lead us to prefer Helpman's model for empirical purposes. (14) comes from optimal pricing rule (7) and zero profit condition (8) . Condition (15) express the equilibrium between supply and demand of labor in each location and comes from firm equilibrium labor requirement (9) and consumers' demand (3).
A market potential approach
Considering equations (11) trough (15) for each location i = 1, 2, ..., Φ, we get a simultaneous system of Φ×5 equations in Φ×5 unknowns (P H,i , Y i , w i , λ i , P M,i ) that summarize the equilibrium of our spatial economy. In order to give some insight about model behavior is better to start from standard results in international trade theory. Krugman [1991] , and Helpman [1998] are essentially trade models in which a certain number open-economies trade goods among each other and factors are perfectly mobile. Technology and preferences are the same and there is a barrier in trading abroad given by transportation costs. If all markets were perfectly competitive and goods homogenous we would expect, according to the Heckscher-Ohlin theory, trade flows to be driven by factor endowments. However, the perfect mobility of at least one production factor would prevent trade to occur in equilibrium. In fact, a well known result in neoclassical theory of international trade is that the combination of factor mobility and barriers to trade destroys any comparative advantage leading to autarchic economies.
17 This is certainly not surprising in the light of the spatial impossibility theorem by Fujita and Thisse [2001] , and applied to our framework would mean that firms and consumers would locate in space proportionally to the exogenous endowments H i . Therefore, there should be no room for market potential-type analysis as economic activities would be distributed just as exogenous factors are, showing no other meaningful spatial correlation.
Clearly, this is in sharp contrast with the observable features of the economic landscape. The existence of cities, industrial districts, and regional imbalances is thus a puzzle for the standard competitive-markets theory. One way to get out of this trap is to advocate marshallian (or technological) externalities in production and/or consumption. Although very popular in urban and regional economics, as well as in economic growth theory, this approach suffers of at least two serious limitations. First, it introduces agglomeration almost by definition by either assuming its exogenous existence, or using ad-hoc mechanisms.
18 Second, agents' interaction is essential to externalities so, as long as this interaction needs a material institution to be effective (like a city or a district), the corresponding externalities are clearly limited in their geographic extent.
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The NEG literature offers the possibility to treat agglomeration in a more flexible and rigorous way by means of increasing returns, imperfect competition, and product differentiation. To understand the forces at work in Helpman [1998] it is useful to consider the following simplified thought experiment. Suppose that we have just two locations with the same exogenous housing stock, and that the economy starts with a symmetric distribution of firms and workers. With just two location we have, supposing symmetry, just one distance to take care: v i,k = v. The only candidate for equilibrium in a competitive market world would be precisely the symmetric one as the two locations are a priori identical. Suppose furthermore that, for whatever reason, one firm decides to move from one region to the other. How does this affect firms profitability? The presence of one more firm will increase competition in the product and labor markets of the location receiving the firm, thus tending to reduce local profits and to make relocation unprofitable. If there was no mobility of workers, this would be the end of the story and regions would remain identical. However, the rise in the number of local varieties that can be bought without incurring in transportation costs, and the rise in labor demand and wages tend to attract more workers. This migration increases local expenditure (a demand linkage) and eases competition in the labor market, so tending to increase local profits and to attract more firms. The demand linkage is here particularly important because increasing returns makes production expansion attractive, and market power gives to firms the possibility to better exploit such potential gains.
Whether the overall effect of entry is to increase the profitability of local firms (encouraging further entry thus leading to an asymmetric equilibrium distribution of economic activities ), or to lower that profitability (leading to exit and reestablishing symmetry), depends on parameters of the model (σ, µ, v). As long as σ(1 − µ) > 1, agglomeration never occurs and economic activities will be equally distributed. If instead σ(1 − µ) < 1 then, depending on the level of transportation costs v, we will observe agglomeration or dispersion. 20 Conforming to intuition both a smaller degree of substitution between varieties (lower σ), and a greater share of manufacturing consumption (higher µ) causes centripetal forces to strength. 21 However, the effect of a transportation costs change in Helpman [1998] is different from Krugman [1991] . In Krugman [1991] agglomeration occurs if transportation costs are sufficiently small (values of v close to one), whether in Helpman [1998] is the other way round. This is due to the different hypothesis on the homogenous good H.
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In Krugman's model H is a tradable good that can be shipped from one location to another, without incurring in transportation costs, produced by means of an immobile factor (say land or unskilled workers). The demand for goods coming from the owners of this factor is thus tied to the origin location, and still represents an considerable market to be served. When shipping is prohibitive, centrifugal forces dominates because immobile demand is simply too far to be reached efficiently, and firms find convenient to relocate in rural areas to both avoid transportation costs and enjoy a fiercer price competition. If v is instead sufficiently high firms can agglomerate to 20 If we relax the assumption that the housing stock is the same in the two regions things do not change that much. If σ(1 − µ) > 1 economic activities will be distributed only according to exogenous factor endowments, even if with a slight disproportion. If instead σ(1 − µ) < 1 then, depending on the level of transportation costs, we will again observe agglomeration or dispersion but agglomeration can now occur only in the location with more housing stock. 21 When σ(1−µ) > 1 an increase of µ, or a decrease of σ, cause the disproportion between the number of firms residing in one location and the corresponding fixed endowments to widen. On the other hand if σ(1 − µ) < 1 simulations shows clearly that the effect it to restrict the range of transportation costs for which symmetric equilibrium is stable. 22 There are other models than Helpman [1998] in which a concentration of consumption and production cannot take place for low values of shipping costs. See for example Adrian [1996] , Hadar [1996] and, although in a different framework, Krugman and Venables [1995] , and Puga [1999] . However, one should not consider these results as opposite to Krugman [1991] type models, but instead as complement. Each model focuses only on few of the possible many forces one can think about in addressing location choice issues. Therefore, each of them should be considered as a piece of a complicated puzzle; a very simplified example of how the world can works. About the relation between markets integration and agglomeration, the general picture coming out of from the NEG literature is, as argued by Ottaviano and Puga [1998] , one in which for high trade costs the need to supply markets locally encourages firms to locate in different regions. For intermediate values of trade costs, cost and demand linkages take over and firms and workers cluster together. Finally, for low values of trade costs location is determined by the price of those factors (like unskilled workers) and goods (like houses) that are not mobile.
enjoy the advantages of increasing returns but still offer competitive delivered prices in abandoned regions. In Helpman [1998] , is instead the need for firms to compensate workers for the cost of housing in congested areas that can eventually reestablish symmetry. In order to attract workers firms must in fact provide them higher nominal wages as the price of the immobile good H (P H,i ), reflecting the pressure of an increasing demand, tends to be higher in agglomerated areas. Furthermore, the lower transportation costs are the less important the location issue is and in the limit, when shipping has no cost, only factor endowments matter. Thus if v raises sufficiently firms have no possibility to attract workers as the amount of their agglomeration incentives is being eroded by transportation costs decline.
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When we come back to our original framework, considering an arbitrary number of locations and fixed factor distribution, the story becomes much more complicated and few analytical results are available. The first thing to say is that we normally observe a multiplicity of equilibria. Simulations show that agglomeration takes place by means of a self-reinforcing process in which small initial asymmetries among locations are then magnified by market forces, leading to what Fujita and Thisse [1996] call putty clay geography: there is a priori great flexibility on where particular activities locate, but once spatial differences take shape they become quite rigid. The actual equilibrium configuration of our space-economy is thus path-dependent 24 and markets-centrality, as well as factor endowments 25 , constitutes preferential requirements for a location to become a cluster of firms and consumers. Other things equal if a location has a better access, somehow defined, to appetizing markets some firms will initially delocate there in order to take the advantages that markets-proximity, due to their increasing returns technology, gives them. If the balance is in favor of centripetal forces, this will in turn increase local wages and goods expenditure attracting workers as well 23 The way the so-called black-hole condition works is also different in the two models. In Krugman [1991] this condition is given by σ(1 − µ) < 1, and if satisfied implies that agglomeration always occurs no matter how transportation costs are. The parallel with the irresistible attracting power of a black-hole is evident. By contrast, in Helpman [1998] there is no proper black-hole condition because agglomeration always depends on v.
24 This is why it is usually said that history matters. 25 The fact that many NEG models abstract from factor endowments considerations assuming an equal distribution, does not mean that one wants to deny their importance. The a priori equivalence among locations is just a metaphor used to better isolate the forces one wants to show, as well as a convenient working hypothesis. Ricci [1999] shows clearly how both factor endowments and NEG forces matter for the distribution of firms and trade. Moreover, Davis and Weinstein [1998] and Davis and Weinstein [1999] find empirical evidence of a joint influence of comparative advantages and market access in determining trade flows at both international and regional level.
as other firms. It becomes now clear the connection of this model, with older traditions in economics and in particular with the market-potential literature.
Actually, Harris (1954) market-potential function relates the potential demand for goods and services produced in a location with that location's proximity to consumer's markets, or:
where MP i is the market potential of location i, Y k is an index of purchasing capacity of location k (usually income), d ik is (as usual) the distance between two generic locations i and k, and g() is a decreasing function. The higher is the market potential index of a location, the higher is its attraction power on production activities. In Helpman model, a good measure of a firm incentive to move is given by equilibrium nominal wages. Although firms makes no profits in equilibrium (no matter where they are located), the wage they can afford express their capacity to create value once located in a particular region. 26 Combining equations (11), (13), (15) and applying logarithms to simplify things we get the following expression:
where κ 3 is a function of behavioral parameters (µ, σ, f ). Equation (17) really looks like a market-potential function. It tells us that as long as agglomeration forces are active (σ(1−µ) < 1), the nominal wage in location i (and thus local firms' profitability) is an increasing function of the weighted purchasing 26 An alternative modelling strategy, focusing more explicitly on profits, have been proposed by Puga [1999] . Helpman [1998] and Krugman [1991] , as well as almost all models belonging to the same class, assume that profits are zero in the short-run with workers moving from one location to another in order to equalize real wages in the long-run. In this case firms just follow workers in order to find the labor they need to produce. Puga [1999] instead assumes that inter-location labor markets instantaneously clear in the short-run, leading to real-wage equalization, while firms' profits can differ from zero. In the longrun however firms move toward those regions offering higher gains and market forces will drive profits to zero. Conceptually, these short-run profits are better suited than nominal wages to express a firm gain from relocation. However, as find out by Puga [1999] , using these two alternative dynamics produce virtually no difference, that is why we use nominal wages as a measure of such incentives.
power coming from surrounding locations (Y k ), with weights inversely related to distances d ik (this is the market access component). Crucially, (17) 
Data choice and sources
One of the most common problems in using micro-founded economic models for empirical purposes is the choice of good proxies. Estimation requires actual data, and in some circumstances the choice of the statistic that is best suited to approximate a theoretical variable becomes a difficult task. In the case of H, Y , and d we do not have particular interpretation problems. H is meant to represent those goods and factors that are immobile for consumption or production. Expenditure in housing services actually constitutes a large part of the costs associated with this category. A good proxy is thus given by the total housing stock, that is measured in square meters. The variable Y should instead represent the demand of goods, and a reasonable solution is to take total households disposable income as a measure of a province purchasing power. Finally, d is the distance between two generic locations. The unavailability of more sophisticated measures of distances has lead us to use a physic metric. In particular we adopt the crow fly distance between the centers of each province (as obtain by polygonal approximation) using GIS software.
However, when we think about w some complication arise. One natural solution, followed by Hanson [1998] , is to consider it as just labor income, thus using county statistics on average earnings of wage and salary workers. Although this solution may be to some extent acceptable for US, it seems difficult to argue the same for Europe and in particular for Italy. First, it is a wide-spread opinion that in Europe conditions of local supply and demand play a little role in the determination of wages 27 , thus making them unsuited to express re-location incentives. In some countries, and this is the case for Italy, wages are in fact set at national level for many production sectors. Second, the relatively scarce mobility of people prevents the prices system to clear labor markets excess-supply. 28 Agglomeration externalities are thus likely to magnify regional imbalances in both income and unemployment rates rather than shifting massively production activities.
In line with these considerations, US economic activities are more spatially concentrated than in Europe. The 27 EU regions with highest manufacturing employment density account for nearly one half of manufacturing employment in the Union and for 17% of the Unions total surface and 45% of its population. The 14 US States with highest manufacturing employment density also account for nearly one half of the countries manufacturing employment, but with much smaller shares of its total surface (13%) and population (21%). Figure 1 , borrowed from Hanson [1998] , gives an idea of US production concentration. It depicts counties employment density in 1990 as relative to US average: the 100 most economically active counties, with an average employment density of 1,169 workers per square kilometer accounted for 41.2% of US employment, but only 1.5% of US land area in 1990.
By contrast, in Europe agglomeration is more a matter of income disparities and unemployment. 25% of EU citizens live in so-called Objective 1 regions. These are regions whose Gross Domestic Product per capita is below 75% of the Unions average. By contrast only two US states (Mississippi and West Virginia) have a Gross State Product per capita below 75% of the countries average, and together they account for less than 2% of the US population. Moreover, regional employment imbalances are a special feature of European economic space. The case of Italy is best known, with Campania having a 1996 unemployment rate 4.4 times as high as Valle d'Aosta. But large regional differences exist in all European countries, as shown by figure 2 borrowed from Overman and Puga [1999] . In the United Kingdom, Merseyside has an unemployment rate 3.2 times that of the Surrey-Sussex region; in Belgium, the unemployment rate of Hainut is 2.2 times that of Vlaams Brabant; in Spain, Andalucía has an unemployment rate 1.8 times that of La Rioja; in France, Languedoc-Roussillon has a rate twice that of Alsace; and so on.
Both figure 1 and 2 suggest the existence of forces shaping the distribution of economic activities in asymmetric way. However, the point is that the structural differences between US and EU cause these forces to have a more visible impact on different economic indicators. At this point, it is probably better to come back to Helpman [1998] to look for some guiding insights. In that framework, w is the zero-profit earning of the only production factor (labor), and is mend to be a measure of a firm profitability to re-locate in one particular region. As long as mobility is limited, the transfer of firms in more appetizing locations would produce unemployment in abandoned regions while pushing factor market to full employment elsewhere. However, the fact that basic wages are more or less fixed does not prevent firms to give them, if they have the means, other form of remunerations in order to attract them. Therefore, one can think to use total labor expenditure per employee as a measure of the shadow wage. However, labor is not the only production factor in real world. In Helpman [1998] it stands for the aggregate of mobile factor, as opposed to the immobile ones (H), and even for US it is in this light problematic to associate w just to wages.
The solution we will adopt tries to address these issues. We first start by GDP subtracting expenditure in housing services, that actually represent a large part of fixed factors costs. Using statistics on rented house number and prices from ISTAT, we have in fact construct a measure of house spending per province. Then, we subtract it to GDP and divide for active population to get our w. 29 The variable obtained is meant to represent the average mobile-factors remuneration. Obviously, our measure contains also profits. We do not believe that this poses serious problems as profit is, in principle, precisely the variable leading firms' to relocate. Table 1 contains summary statistics on w, H, and Y , as well as on provinces surface and population. All nominal variables are in 1996 prices and the unit is one million liras. Housing H is measured in squared meters, while population is in thousand of people and provinces surface is expressed in squared kilometers. Data have an yearly basis and refers to the interval 1991-1998. Statistics on rented-house number and prices come from ISTAT. Data on GDP, population, employees, housing stock, and households' disposable income come from SINIT database (Sistema Informativo per gli Investimenti Territoriali). This extraordinary database, that contains lots of local statistics for Italy, have been collected from the "Dipartimento Politiche di Sviluppo e Coesione -Ministero dell'Economia e Finanze". Finally, distances have been obtained with GIS software and are expressed in kilometers.
Econometric concerns
The main goal of our estimations is to obtain a measure of structural parameters from (17) . However, the data-set we have is a panel covering two dimensions: space and time. Therefore, the actual formulation we use is:
where indexes i and t corresponds, respectively, to space and time, while ε i,t is a random term that, for the moment, is just assumed to be serially uncorrelated in the time dimension, that is Cov(ε i,t , ε i,s ) = 0, ∀ t 6 = s.
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The first choice to make is the geographical reference unit. On one hand, this should be as small as possible in order to account for the nature of externalities that the model wants to capture. Helpman [1998] is in fact best suited to describe agglomeration forces at low spatial level, because the hypothesis of labor mobility is certainly not defendable, especially for Italy, on large scale. Furthermore, the tension between an easy access to cheap commodities, and high costs of non-tradable services like housing is certainly a good metaphor for metropolitan areas, but the more we depart from this example the more interpretation become difficult because other forces are certainly at work. However, too high a geographical detail would lead to an intractable amount of information, as well as to a data availability problem. To give an example, if we decide to work on the about 8.100 Italian commons, we will need a matrix of distances with 8100 * (8100 + 1)/2 = 32, 809, 050 free elements to evaluate. Our choice is a compromise between these two different needs, and will actually consist in taking the 103 Italian provinces as reference units.
Turning to more technical questions, we should argue why we choose just (17) in order to get the estimates of structural parameters. In principle, this objective would be better achieved using simultaneous equations techniques on equations (11) trough (15) . Apart from the technical problems of such an approach, is the unavailability of reliable statistics for prices, especially of manufacturing goods (P M,i ), at any interesting geographical level that makes this solution unapplicable. Data on prices can in fact be found at regional level for Italy: this is too much aggregate a unit for our purposes. Equation 30 Later on, we will expicitely test this assumption.
(17) is instead a reduced-form, in algebric sense, of the model that does not contain these two variables, and for which is possible to find adequate local data. This allow us to perform the estimation even if we actually loose some information.
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Another important aspect is related to missing variables like the presence of local amenities (nice weather, ports, road hubs, etc.) and localized externalities (especially human capital ones) that clearly influence the distribution of economic activities and earnings, but are not included in our analysis. As long as these variables are correlated with regressors, and this is indeed very likely to hold, standard econometric techniques would fail. Anyway, when one thinks about both amenities and human capital externalities it is clear that if these factors change over time, this change is very slow. The quality of the working force, as well as the presence of infrastructures and the network of knowledge exchange is thus reasonably constant (for a given location) in a short interval of time. We can thus try to overcome the problem of these missing variables with an appropriate choice of the estimation interval, while treating them as, using standard panel terminology, correlated fixed effects µ i to be included in the random term ε i,t that becomes ε i,t = µ i + u i,t . To get rid of the correlation between µ i and the regressors we could, for example, either apply a time-difference on (18), with 4ε i,t = ε i,t − ε i,t−1 simplifying to 4u i,t = u i,t − u i,t−1 , or use a within transformation. 32 In both cases the term µ i vanishes, shifting all problems of efficiency and consistency to the properties of u i,t .
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Equation (18) is non-linear. Once applied the opportune transformation (time-difference or within), one can think of using non-linear least squares type techniques. However, the nature of the variables involved raise a clear endogeneity issue, making the properties of such an estimation method doubtfully. First, the presence on the right hand side of a weighted sum over space of the same variable appearing as independent (w i,t ), is in fact a certain source of bias. Accordingly with spatial econometrics theory, this sum is in fact interpretable as a space-lagged endogenous variable and it is well known that, in this case, least squares method does not work regardless of error 31 Actually, equation (17) comes from the combination of equilibrium relations (11), (13) , and (15) . Consequently, we are not using the information contained in both equation (12) and (14) that, together with the other three, fully describe the long-run equilibrium of our economy. 32 Note that, incidentally, by using either time-difference or whitin transformation we are eliminating κ 3 and so we loose the parameter f .
33 Hanson [1998] actually uses a time-difference approach. In addition he also tried to control directly for localized externalities and factor endowments using data on weather, proximity to ports, etc. Anyway, the joint use of these two tools did not produce significant changes in his estimation results, as compared to the time difference specification only.
properties 34 . Furthermore, in the structural form of our model the variables w i,t are determined simultaneously with incomes Y i,t . The circularity between factor earnings and income is certainly not debatable in economic theory, and in our framework implies that the explanatory variable Y i,t is correlated with disturbances u i,t . Finally, even if the amount of fixed factors H i,t is supposed to be exogenous in Helpman model, it is not difficult to imagine that, for example, pressures on the housing market do not simply lead to price movements, but also encourage construction of new buildings.
The solution adopted by Hanson [1998] is to use non-liner least squares, while trying to break the endogeneity problem with an appropriate choice of the geographical reference unit. Following his reasoning, u i,t should reflect temporary shocks that influence local business cycles. The finest the geographical unit we use for locations, the smaller is the impact of such shocks on more geographically aggregated variables. Furthermore, if these shocks are really local, their eventual spread on other regions should be quantitatively negligible. Technically speaking, this amounts to assume that disturbances u i,t are spatially uncorrelated, and that the degree of spatial interaction between w, Y , and H is sufficiently limited to break the relation between u i,t and geographically aggregated variables. Consequently, the strategy used by Hanson [1998] consists in taking the finest possible geographical level for the dependent variable w on the left-hand side of (18) , while using the most (reasonable) aggregate level for the explanatory variables figuring on the right-hand side. Actually, he uses data on w for the 3075 US counties as dependent variables. However, for each county i he utilizes data on w, Y , H, and distances at continental state level, so not counties data, as independent variables. Formally speaking, the two indexes i and k does not correspond anymore to the same location set. Index i = 1, 2..., Φ 1 corresponds in fact to US counties, while k = 1, 2, ..., Φ 2 corresponds to US continental states.
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He then took two years and, once applied a time-difference to (18) , he performed a cross-section exploiting just the space dimension with least squares. Moreover, as a particular remedy for simultaneity he subtracts (for each i) the specific contribution of that county in the formation of the corresponding state aggregate variable. For example, in the case of the observation for Los Angeles county he subtracts the housing stock of Los Angeles from that of California (but not from other states), before using the latter in the sum of explanatory variables. 34 See Anselin [1988] . 35 In equation (18) for instance he has, for a given year t, a sum of Φ 2 = 49 terms (the number of US continental states plus the district of Columbia) on the right hand side, for each of the Φ 1 = 3075 equations to fit.
Hanson's idea sounds like instrumentation, even if he actually did not use this technique. He uses state level on the right-hand side precisely because he needs something that is uncorrelated with disturbances, but still linked with the (real) explanatory variables at county level. Indeed, these are the features of good instrumental variables. Therefore, one can think of keeping county level on the right hand side, and use geographically aggregated data directly as instruments for the estimation. It is clear that, as long as Hanson strategy works, the other should work as well. In any case, an instrumental variable approach would be conceptually preferable because it allow us to maintain an homogeneous space unit on both sides of (18) . In economic geography theory, as well as in spatial econometrics, it is in fact well known that the level of aggregation matters a lot. When one is trying to analyze spatial data, choosing different geographical units can in fact completely change results. Therefore, the fact that Hanson actually mixes state and counties variables in the same equation makes interpretation problematic, and could lead to estimation bias. In order to explore the extent of this possible aggregation bias, we will perform a comparative estimation using the two techniques: a non-linear least squares Hanson type, and a non-linear instrumental variables one. 36 Furthermore, there is another aspect in favor of instrumental variables: efficiency. By aggregating explanatory variables, Hanson looses a lot of information ending with a sum of just 49 terms instead of 3075. By contrast, all the information contained in county data would be preserved with instrumental variables as one can keep a fine geographical level also on the right-hand side. Efficiency is not really a problem for Hanson's analysis because he has still a lot of data to fit. However, Italy is relatively small as compared to US and we will certainly not have, as he did, 3 thousand observation to infer on.
There is, anyway, something unclear in the crucial identifying assumption on which the two estimation procedure rely. As we said before, disturbances u i,t needs to be spatially uncorrelated, and the degree of spatial interaction should be sufficiently limited for spatially aggregated variables to be uncorrelated with u i,t . The first assumption is quite clear, and can indeed be tested using spatial econometrics tools like Moran or LM spatial correlation type tests 37 . The second is, on the contrary, quite obscure and needs to be better clarified. The fact that error terms are not spatially correlated certainly limits the amount of spatial interaction in the sense that u k,t has, for example, no impact on w i,t through u i,t . Anyway, even in this case, u k,t does have an 36 A good exposition of non-linear instrumental variables properties and the associated inference techniques can be found in Hamilton [1994] . 37 See Anselin [1988] , and Anselin and Kelejian [1997] .
impact on w i,t through w k,t , that figures as an explanatory variable in (18) , because w k,t is it-self a function of u k,t . The magnitude of this correlation thus depends on models parameters in the same way as the extent of spatial externalities. In other words, is the degree of spatial interaction predicted by the model itself that should be weak enough for spatially aggregated variables to be uncorrelated with disturbances. Anyway, how weak it should be? Hanson [1998] estimations actually predicts quite a limited geographical scope for agglomeration externalities, but it is sufficient? The answer is probably no, and we can see it directly from the quality of instruments. In fact, if the procedure does work, it would also imply that aggregated variables to be used as instruments, should be poorly related to the local explanatory variables we are instrumenting, thus causing estimates to have poor t-ratios. So, the fact that parameters' estimates are significant, as they are in Hanson [1998] , is itself a strong signal that the aggregation trick to overcome endogeneity does not work. A possible way-out from this endogeneity trap that, at the same time, would allow us to preserve the same space dimension for all variables, could be to better exploit the time dimension using dynamic panel data techniques a la Arellano and Bond [1991] . NEG models are conceived mainly to reply to theoretical questions rather than to be used for empirical purposes. Compared to applied macro-economic models, they are in fact represented by systems of equilibrium equations in which almost all variables are endogenous, so making the identification problem impossible to solve for a given time t (i.e. using only the cross-section dimension). Endogeneity comes precisely from the simultaneity nature of these models linking, in equilibrium, the Φ economies present in space all together. On the other hand, NEG pay less attention to the time-dynamics. The evolution of the system over space is in fact the main concern of analysis, and this is why time receives relatively less attention. To us this means that, once we control for this second dynamic we are actually not interested in, we can use the information coming from the time-dimension to solve the identification problem. Following Arellano and Bond [1991] idea, we can thus think of taking equation (18), make a first difference in order to eliminate fixed effects, and then use past levels of endogenous variables, starting from t − 2, as instruments for the estimation. Convergence would be reached with the cross-section dimension, and the instruments used for the equation relative to location i could be just past values of w, Y , H relative to the same location; thus keeping the same space dimension for dependent, explanatory, and instrumental variables. We are implicitly reposing on the following crucial identifying restrictions:
The first set of restrictions requires absence of spatial correlation, and can be investigated by means of an appropriate test. The second calls for absence of residual time-dynamics. The Arellano and Bond [1991] GMM estimator is in fact incompatible with disturbances having an AR structure: the dynamic need to be captured into model. Anyway, as it is marginal for our analysis, we do not need to model this dynamics, but just to control for it. To this scope, a time-lagged value of ln(w i,t ), as well as a complete set of time dummies, will be added to regressors in the estimation of (18) . Tests on residuals time-autocorrelation will then allow to investigate the validity of such an assumption. Finally, the third type of conditions qualifies weak exogeneity and, together with the others, makes past values of endogenous variables good instruments. Contrary to Hanson procedure however, the validity of instruments could be directly assessed by means of a Sargan test on over-identifying restrictions.
Two final observations are in order. First, to actually implement estimations we should define distance weights f (d i,k ). These weights should measure the amount of economic interaction between location. Helpman [1998] is essentially a trade model, so a good proxy for economic interaction is given by trade flows. Hanson [1998] uses the exponential form f (d i,k ) = exp −τ d ik , where τ ∈ [0, ∞) is an (inverse) measure of transportation costs to be estimated, and d i,k is distance between i and k. For our dynamic panel estimation, we will instead use something more rooted in trade theory: the power function f (d i,k ) = θ d ψ i,k . This functional form have been extensively used in both gravity equation and home bias literature 38 . To make spatial econometrics techniques directly applicable we will estimated θ, while using for ψ values coming from the literature 39 . The distance weight f (d i,k ) in (18) is raised to the power σ − 1, and so we are actually interested in ψ (σ − 1). Following Head and Mayer [2000], a reasonable estimate for ψ (σ − 1) is −1, so that the distance decay we will use is:
i,k . Furthermore, as standard in spatial econometrics, we will give a zero weight to observations referring to the same location, i.e. f (d i,i ) σ−1 = 0. Second, equation (18) is not linear. This certainly complicates the implementation of dynamic panel techniques and, more importantly, could cause estimations to be extremely unstable. As known in applied econometrics, the combination of non-linearity, endogeneity, and instrumentation is dangerous mix that cause criterion functions to have many local minima, thus making interpretation of results ambiguous. Note that this last critic applies to Hanson procedure as well. The solution we adopt is then to estimate a linearized version of equation (18) . This approach is not new for NEG applied models, and have been pioneered by Combes and Lafourcade [2001] with promising results. In Appendix 1, we formally derive the following linear counterpart of (18):
where
, and for examplē
. Equation (19) is now linear in parameters and can be estimated using standard panel techniques. Adding time dummies and a time-lag of ln(w i,t ) to control for time-dynamics, we can rewrite it in a more compact way: ln(w t ) = i dum t + ln(w t−1 )A + WȲ t B 1 + WH t B 2 + Ww t B 3 + ε t (20) where bold variables are column vectors containing observations for the Φ locations at time t, W is a ΦxΦ spatial weighting matrix with generic element
i,k , i is a vector of ones, and dum t is a time-dummy. Equation (20) will be the one we will actually use for our panel investigations. With estimates of B 1 , B 2 , and B 3 in our hands, we can then trace back the implied values of µ, σ, and θ and, using the Delta method, make inference on them.
To summarize,we will first use data on the 103 Italian provinces to estimate equation (18) using both Hanson non-linear least squares (NLLS) procedure, and the non-linear instrumental variables (NLIV) technique we proposed 40 . The two methods consist of cross-sections and rest on the same statistical assumptions, with the second being preferable because it does not mix observations referring to different geographical units. This will allow us to compare directly results with Hanson [1998] , as well as to shed some light on the bias coming from space-inhomogeneous observations. The two points in time we took to make time-difference are 1991 and 1998. We will then go through our preferred specification, that is the panel a panel estimation of (20) using Arellano and Bond [1991] estimator. At the cost of linearization, this method should allow us to address properly the endogeneity issue. Crucially, a test on the validity of instruments could be actually performed in this framework. The database used in this case will consist of yearly data for the entire period 1991-1998.
To account for possible structural differences between continental Italy and the two island of Sicily and Sardegna, we also got estimates on continental provinces only for all specifications. Further details about estimation techniques, spatial aggregation, and instruments are given in Appendix 2. Tables 3 and 4 show respectively NLIV and NLLS estimates of the non-linear market potential function (18) while Table 5 , which is the most important for us, contains our panel estimations for the linearized form (20) . The first column of each table refers to results obtained using data on all provinces while, in the second, data on continental provinces only have been used. Anyway, in all specifications, the two set of estimations do not differ significantly, and so that we will refer directly to estimates on all provinces. First of all, one can notice that punctual estimates of table 4, which are obtained with the same NLLS methodology proposed by Hanson [1998] , looks very similar to his findings. Although precaution is needed, because our limited data set dimension probably causes standard errors to be quite high, this suggest that the different proxy we used for w should be a good one for Italy. We are in fact able, replicating its technique, to get something that is perfectly consistent with the results he got using local wages for US.
Estimation results
However, a closer comparison of Tables 3 and 4 , reveals immediately two important things. Although both procedures rest on the same statistical hypothesis, NLIV estimates are more precise and, with particular reference to σ, quite different from NLLS ones. As we argued in the above section, precision is a consequence of the more efficient way in which NLIV treats the information. The spatial aggregation of regressors in NLLS thus lead to loose lots of information and, more importantly, it is probably the cause of the differences in parameters' estimates. The fact that Hanson's procedure actually mixes county with state data in the same regression equations could in fact lead to an aggregation bias. Coherently with our NLLS results, in Hanson [1998] values of σ lies between 6 and 11. By contrast, NLIV here indicates something around 2, suggesting that the magnitude of the aggregation bias is important. In both cases the crucial specification test, the Moran statistic, does not detect a significant spatial autocorrelation in residuals 41 . Anyway, as we argue in the previous section, this does not suffice to rule out endogeneity problems. It is in fact the significance of the estimates itself that suggests that the aggregation trick does not work. As long as one is successful in controlling for the time-dynamics, panel data provides instead a space-homogenous framework in which we can actually overcome endogeneity. Crucially, explicit tests on identifying restrictions and instruments validity can be performed in this case. Table 5 shows our panel results, that we are going to discuss in details. We can first note that the implied values of σ, µ, and θ are all very precisely estimated, with values lying in the corresponding interval predicted by theory. For the case of µ, it is in fact between 0 and 1 and in line with more reasonable values of the expenditure on traded goods than Hanson's estimates. Actually, in our stylized model product M is probably best seen as the aggregate of traded goods, as opposed to the non-traded ones (H), like housing services. In Italy, the share of expenditure on housing (1 − µ) is around 0.2; a value that is consistent with our findings. However in Hanson [1998] , as well as in our NLLS and NLIV estimates, µ is always too high with values around 0.9 or even bigger.
For the elasticity of substitution, we got estimates between 3 and 4 that are significantly different from Hanson's findings. Although recent empirical studies indicate, using sectorial data, values of the elasticity of substitution between 4 and 9 42 , we do not believe that these values are coherent with our underlying theory. Helpman [1998] is in fact a very aggregated vision of the economy with just two sectors: traded goods (M), and non traded ones (H). Consequently, the aggregate M contains goods that are actually very different from consumers' point of view (like cars and shoes), and we cannot certainly expect to find high values for their elasticity of substitution.
The other structural estimates to interpret are those of σ/(σ − 1), and σ(1−µ). Concerning the quantity σ(1−µ), one can see that it is significantly lower than 1, and in our framework this means that centripetal forces are active. Agglomeration can thus occur, and its strength depends on the level of transportation costs. Similar results have been obtained by Hanson [1998] . Finally, σ/(σ − 1) should express the equilibrium ratio between marginal and 41 The null hypothesis of the test is the absence of spatial autocorrelation. The test statistic can be corrected, as we actually do here, to account for both endogeneity in regressors and instrumentation, and is asymptotically distributed as a standardized normal. See Anselin [1988] , and Anselin and Kelejian [1997] for further details.
42 See Feenstra [1994] , and Head and Ries [2001] .
average costs. The value we got is quite high compared to both Hanson's findings and intuition, implying that firms have a mark-up of about 40% over marginal costs. This is probably due to the simplifying assumptions of Helpman [1998] that actually cause σ to be at the same time the elasticity of substitution between goods, the price-elasticity of consumers' demand, and an inverse measure of increasing returns to scale. In principle however σ is an elasticity of substitution, and this is our preferred interpretation. Another observation about estimates is in order. As we said before, the crucial difference between our theory-based market potential (17) and the Harris type (16) , is that the second does not control for wages and prices of others locations. In Helpman [1998] , an increase in other locations' housing stock (H k ) or wages(w k ), cause w i to increase in the long-run in order to compensate workers for lower housing prices and higher earnings they can enjoy elsewhere. Coherently, our estimations suggest that both variables actually play a significant role, as explicitly measured by the significance of B 2 and B 3 , in understanding the forces at work is a space economy.
Turning to endogeneity and correlation issues, we can notice that all specification tests support our panel estimation. The Sargan test on overidentifying restrictions does not in fact reject the validity of our instruments. We actually used all past levels of ln(w i,t ), W iwt , W iȲt , and W iHt , where W i refers the the generic i column of the spatial weighting matrix W, starting from t − 2 as instruments for estimation. Table 2 contains the (total) contemporaneous serial correlation matrix between ln(w i,t ), W iwt , W iȲt , and W iHt . Furthermore, the two test on time autocorrelation behaves in the good way. If the u i,t are actually not correlated over time, then one should detect a significant (negative) first order correlations in differenced residuals 4û i,t , and an absence of "pure" second order correlation 43 . As one can see, this is actually what we found. This suggests that the inclusion of a dynamic term in our equation (w t−1 ), which by the way turns out to be strongly significant, has probably allowed us to properly "capture" the timedynamics (that we need to control for) into the model. Finally, to exclude the presence of residual spatial correlation an adequate test is needed too. Anyway, as far as we know, there is still no test procedure that exploits both the time and cross-section information (coming from panel estimations), that at the same time accounts for endogeneity and instrumentation. However, one can certainly test year by year, and this is what we have actually done in Table 6 where the Moran statistic have been calculated for those years in which a sufficient number of instruments were available. As one can see, we did not found evidence of a significant spatial correlation.
Finally, in order to have an idea of the spatial extent of agglomeration forces, we have simulated the effect on w caused by an exogenous temporary shock on income, as measured by equation (20) . Using our panel estimates from Table 5 (first column) we have first evaluated equilibrium wages by means of (20) , using actual data on ln(w i,t−1 ),w k,t ,Ȳ k,t , andH k,t for t =1992. Then, we have decreased the 1992 income of the 5 Latium' provinces of 10% before re-computing ln(w i,t ). Finally, as (20) contains a dynamic term linking ln(w i,t ) with its past values, we have computed the sum of yearly changes on ln(w i,t ) induced by this shock on income, occurring in 1992, over the entire period 1992-1998. Figure 3 shows the implied total percentage decrease in the values of w i,t consequent to this simulated shock. Although we are actually under-evaluating the effect of such shock 44 , Figure 3 points out clearly that the impact is certainly not negligible and, contrary to Hanson [1998] , it is not so geographically bounded. The latter result is partially due to the different choice of the spatial weights. Hanson uses an (inverse) exponential space decay. As it is well known, this function goes to zero very fast and so it tends "naturally" to limit the extent of spatial interaction, as opposed to the polynomial function we used. Interestingly, the shock seems to be "asymmetric", in the sense that south provinces are more affected than north ones. This is certainly not surprising in the light of Italian economic geography. Everything equal, the relative importance of Latium purchasing power is in fact higher for the south where local demand, as measured by households disposable income, is lower than in the richer north.
Conclusions
The NEG literature has provided a series of fully-specified general equilibrium models capable to address rigorously the agglomeration phenomenon. The combination of increasing returns, market imperfections, and trade costs creates new forces that, together with factor endowments, determine the distribution of economic activities. These spatial externalities makes agents' location choice highly interdependent, thus allowing to understand the spatial correlation between demand and production observed empirically by the market potential literature.
Using a time-space panel data on Italian provinces, we have estimated a linearized version of a theory-based market potential function derived from Helpman [1998] model. In particular, we proposed an alternative estimation methodology, based on Arellano and Bond [1991] panel estimator, that tries to address properly those endogeneity issues related to the estimation of spatial structural models. Our results are consistent with the hypothesis that product-market linkages, coming from increasing returns and trade costs, actually influence the geographic concentration of economic activities. Furthermore, they underline the role of theory in identifying the forces at work in a spatial economy, and especially those economic indicators that "capture" such tensions. Interestingly, simulations suggest, contrary to Hanson [1998] , that the impact of such spatial externalities is not so limited in geographical extent. We have also experimented, with promising results, a new proxy variable for local equilibrium wages. The choice we made for w seems in fact to be capable to capture local agglomeration forces for Italy, and to give results comparable with Hanson [1998] findings.
There are several possible directions for further research. One natural extension of our framework would be to obtain estimates using European data. As shown by Overman and Puga [1999] , national borders are in fact less and less important in Europe, while regions are becoming the best unit of analysis. What really matters is spatial proximity, therefore a theory-based investigation on agglomeration forces at European level would be desirable. A second issue is related to the simplifying assumptions that leads Helpman [1998 ] to be cumbersome for empirical interpretation. As we already saw, the fact that σ is at the same a measure of 3 different things is very annoying. A promising approach in tackling this problem is given by Ottaviano, Tabuchi, and Thisse [2001] . Using a more elaborated demand structure and transportation technology, this model allows in fact to clearly separate (by means of different parameters) elasticity of demand, elasticity of substitution and increasing returns, as well as firms' pricing policies. Finally, as shown in Krugman and Venables [1995] , Puga [1999] , and Combes [1997] , inputoutput linkages can also be the source of agglomeration externalities. This is particularly true for Europe in which the mobility of firms and goods is certainly higher than that of people. This, however require the use of a more detailed modellization of production than the two goods-type we have in Helpman [1998] . Of particular interest in this line of research is Combes and Lafourcade [2001] . Using data on local labor markets, for many production sectors, they are actually able to estimates short run re-location profits for French firms. 
, we get equation (19) . 
